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This article analyses the approximation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the European Union (EU) 
from a Central European perspective, with a focus on the role of the Visegrad Four (V4) states 
in this process. The article sets out with two strategies of state-building exercised by the West in 
the aftermath of the Dayton Peace Treaty – a ‘hands-on’ and ‘hands-off’ (or ownership) strategy. 
It analyses the position of the Visegrad states towards these strategies. The text mainly explains the 
overall engagement of V4 in the context of EU enlargement policies. The article asks to what extent 
the four partners cooperate with each other and with likely regional partners Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Austria. The positions of the Central European states are informed by qualitative interviews with 
stakeholders and research literature on external governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is concluded 
that the V4’s engagement is limited due to small budget commitments and to a signifi cant overlap 
of V4 positions with the positions of more active European partners.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article analyses the approximation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Euro pean 
Union (EU) from a Central European perspective. Since the Peace Treaty of 
Dayton in December 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been under close supervi-
sion by the international community. The United States of America and major 
European states have a strong interest in integrating the country into the West 
and the Euro pean Union. This interest is shared by the smaller and newer states 
of the European Union that are geographically close and culturally similar to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The article specifically tests the interests and ambitions of 
the Visegrad Four (V4) states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hun-
gary in Bosnia.2 The Western Balkan states and their proximity to the EU has 
been a constant issue for the Visegrad states over the last years. The V4 presi-
dency programmes and reports reflect this concern (Visegrad Group 2012; 2013; 
2014). V4 cooperation in EU enlargement affairs has intensified over time (Král 
– Bartovic 2012; Strážay 2012; Żornaczuk 2013). All four Visegrad states have 
a profound interest in the region. Their own transformation and EU integration 
experience has put the V4 in a position of seeing themselves in the roles of ideal 
advocates and advisers for prospective EU members who have to overcome many 
obstacles on their way to full membership (Walsch 2014). The research question 
is as follows: to what extent do the Visegrad Four states cooperate and coordinate 
their policies in order to encourage Europeanization in Bosnia? In order to assess 
the degree of cooperation, original empirical research was undertaken in 2014. 
The article’s sources are in-depth qualitative interviews with stakeholders con-
ducted in May and June of 20143 and are based on the ongoing academic debate 
of external governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The text starts with a short overview of the role of the international community 
in the country.4 This is followed by an analysis of two competing Western exter-
nal governance strategies. The third section of the article turns to the policies of 
2  When speaking about the state, the terms Bosnia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are used synony-
mously. 
3  Despite sincere efforts no representative of Hungary was available for an interview. Neither 
the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the embassy of Hungary in Sarajevo reacted to 
repeated requests.
4  The most important study is the fifty-page report “Bosnia’s Future“ of International Crisis 
Group, published in July 2014. A detailed monograph on the relationship between the EU and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is Tolksdorf (2012). A commendable monograph on ethno-politics is Dzi-
hic (2009), on economic governance Cviić and Sanfey (2010). This article will not specifically 
deal with governance debates. For this see the edited volume of Risse (2011) and, applied to the 
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the edited volume of Keil and Perry (2015).
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the Visegrad Four states. The fourth section deals with the policies of additional 
Central European states. The last section considers scenarios of competition be-
tween Western and non-Western actors in the country. Finally conclusions will be 
drawn from a V4 perspective.
2. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND THE ROLE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the varying roles of the inter-
national community makes the study of influence of external influence in the 
country complicated.5 The political system of the country stems from the Dayton 
Peace Treaty of December 1995. This treaty could end the war and gave way to 
a complicated mode of power-sharing between the three dominant ethnic groups 
and supervised by the international community. The country is divided into two 
entities: the highly centralized Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Federation is divided into ten cantons. In all relevant institu-
tions on all levels each of the three ethnicities (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) are 
represented, following a proportional set-up based on the census of 1991.6 Fol-
lowing the tragedies of the war of 1992 to 1995, national minorities, formerly dis-
placed persons and returning refugees (such persons often fall in more than one 
of the three categories) have particular privileges. The category “ethnicity” and 
the principle of ethnic proportion has led to ethnic divisions in all political proc-
esses throughout the last fifteen years, which has deepened divisions in Bosnian 
society (Moll 2013). The political elites of the country as well as the international 
community can be held responsible for this process. This type of “ethno-propor-
tion” excludes, per definition, citizens from political office, who do not define 
themselves ethnically, e.g. citizens who are the offspring of mixed marriages or 
citizens who define themselves simply as Bosnians, not as Bosniaks (i.e. Mus-
lim Bosnians), (Bosnian) Serbs, or (Bosnian) Croats. This discrimination led to 
legal claims at the European Court of Human Rights in which the plaintiffs were 
given their rights. In the Sejdić-Finci case of 2009, which thus became famous, 
the court ruled that the existing constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina violates the 
human rights of their citizens. The EU now insists on the implementation of this 
5  For an overview see Keranen (2013) and Keil (2013a and 2013b).
6  A newer census is not available. The international community put pressure on state authorities 
to enable legislation for a new census, which took place in 2012. This census has not yet been 
concluded. This is mainly for tactical reasons because politicians of all three ethnic groups fear 
losses (partly due to emigration) and thus a loss of influence. No Bosnian politician seems to 
have interest that the more recent data are made public.
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court judgement (i.e. the constitution of the country has to be modified accord-
ingly), and makes all further rapprochement between the EU and the country de-
pendent on implementation. This is why the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment of the year 2008, although ratified, has not yet been fully operational. All 
working groups and institutional communication since occur pragmatically and 
bear the name “interim.”
The international community, acting on the basis of UN Security Council reso-
lutions, established the Office of the High Representative (OHR), operating origi-
nally with more than 600 staff, though today has been reduced to roughly 100.7 
The two most powerful institutions are the High Representative and the Steering 
Group of the Peace Implementation Council of the international community. The 
Steering Group consists of eleven actors (engaged EU states, large and small, 
the European Commission, the United States, Canada, and Russia). Its task is 
to maintain peace and ensure a functioning Bosnia. In order to carry out this re-
sponsibility, the OHR exercises executive powers (the so-called “Bonn Powers”). 
The OHR made extensive use of its executive powers in the first ten years of its 
existence from 1996 to 2005. This practice is often referred to as the “hands-on 
approach.” Over time, a reconsideration of paradigm among international com-
munity actors occurred. Thought emerged that transformation cannot be inflicted 
onto Bosnian society from outside. Hence, since circa 2006, the gentler own-
ership principle (or “hands-off” approach) has gained prominence, arguing that 
Bosnian society and its elites should want change themselves and thus steer the 
course of change autonomously. Progress under this new principle, however, has 
been minimal. This is why the international community today is doubtful and 
partly very critical of the ownership principle translating into decreasing budgets 
provided by the International Monetary Fund and channelled through the OHR.
The EU and diplomats from member states are important actors as they are 
heavily represented in the OHR. Furthermore, in order to better separate OHR 
and EU agendas, the position of EU Special Envoy was created.8 This position 
is held by the Head of the delegation of the European Commission. The special 
envoy’s office coordinates the agendas of the EU and the member states. As it 
acts mainly in policy-related issues and implementation, it is less politicised than 
the OHR. The contested governance issues remain the responsibility of the OHR, 
7  The subsequent reduction of personnel is a consequence of the ambition of the international 
community to close the OHR in the likely future. This has not yet been the case, but the interna-
tional community and Bosnians agreed on the criteria that have to be fulfilled in order to close 
down the OHR (formulated in five aims and two conditions, the so-called “5+2 agenda“).
8  The most important reason to separate the two was greater ease to find a consensus, which has 
now to be found among the group of EU states only (and could neglect American and Russian 
positions). This was a logical step, as the budget comes from the EU states.
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i.e. the Steering Group of the Peace Implementation Council. Not only have the 
continued disagreements among representatives of the three ethnicities compli-
cated OHR agendas, but so have increasing disagreements within the Steering 
Group. Two conflicts can be observed: that of Western representatives versus 
Russia, and disagreement amongst Western representatives.9 
3. THE WEST AS AN ACTOR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 
TORN BETWEEN TWO STRATEGIES
Among the Western powers, the United States and the United Kingdom advo-
cate a more active and interventionist role for the West. Those within the Bos-
niak community who define themselves as multi-ethnic support this strategy. The 
United States had played a proactive role in the first fifteen years since the Dayton 
Peace Agreement until about 2009, when USA interference waned and external 
governance agendas were left to the European Union. Since circa 2014, the USA 
has been reconsidering its strategy and may again advocate a more intervention-
ist, “hands-on” strategy. This would translate to clear Western positions with a 
strong OHR, supported by a higher number of EUFOR troops, as well as the en-
forcement of sanctions against Bosnian politicians who violate, or do not eagerly 
enforce, OHR and EU decisions. Along this line of thought, it is the role of the 
West to oblige Bosnian politicians to consider a new peace treaty. This treaty has 
been dubbed “Dayton II” and aims to better govern the coexistence of the differ-
ent groups of Bosnian society. Analyst Soeren Keil cites the EU´s poor perform-
ance in the preceding years as the European Commission merely acted as a non-
political executive in charge of minor technical rules and regulations. This role, 
argues Keil, gave a boost to the centrifugal and secessionist forces in Bosnia:
Bosnia is a country in which a violent conflict has been frozen in the institutional architec-
ture of the post-Dayton system. There is absolutely no willingness to compromise and agree 
even on basic decisions such as country-wide standards for health and safety in agriculture. 
The EU has long ignored this reality in Bosnia. Instead, representatives of the Union pre-
tended that EU enlargement is a technical issue, and that all elites have to agree upon is 
how to adopt the technical and procedural standards of Europe. They ignore the centrifugal, 
secessionist forces that work against the very existence of a unified state (Keil 2013c: 4–5).
9  Since the rise of tensions between the West and Russia because of the Ukraine crisis, more 
OHR communiqués are published with the addendum „without Russia.“ This is to be seen in 
the context of Republika Srpska whose separation efforts are implicitly supported by Russia 
(Russia hoping for gaining more legitimacy for the 2014 annexation of Crimea). Also in 2014 it 
happened for the first time that Russia did not approve the annual report of the High Represen-
tative in the UN Security Council. Russia abstained, but did not veto the report.
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Thus, Soeren Keil recommends a much more active, if not forceful role for the 
EU, a role that involves strict use of the all-too-well-known financial carrots and 
sticks policies:
What the country needs is not less EU conditionality […] but instead for the EU to clearly 
define guidelines for the required reforms and how it will support any reform efforts. But 
this also means that the unwillingness to reform must be penalised and that Bosnian elites 
should be punished for non-compliance. This might eventually result in changing electoral 
patterns, once people feel that elites are not taking their main demands and wishes into ac-
count. In this regard, it is important that the EU makes robust use of its financial incentives 
and carries through with such threats as holding back important funding until reforms have 
been agreed and implemented. This will change the incentives for reforms and for political 
compromises among leading political elites (Keil 2013c: 5).
Dissimilarly, most other EU states share the conviction that only the „ownership” 
strategy can harvest long-term and profound results. The Croatian and Serbian 
communities sympathise with this approach. Active agents within the EU that sup-
port this strategy, including the Steering Group members Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden.10 Austria and Slovenia, given their geographic 
proximity, as well as immediate neighbour Croatia, lean towards the ownership 
strategy as well. This approach argues for a more efficient application of the owner-
ship strategy. The central consideration here is that the European Union is willing 
to show some flexibility regarding the application and enforcement of the ruling of 
the European Court for Human Rights (the Sejdić-Finci case). The EU would rather 
not waste time because of the deadlock that the pending case brings to the EU rap-
prochement process, preferring to engage in so-called “High Level” (or often dubbed 
“parallel”) negotiations on EU rapprochement. The EU would do so if and only if 
Bosnian elites are willing to initiate constitutional reforms in the mid and long term. 
A widely read analysis of the European Stability Initiative of 2013 even comes to 
the conclusion that insisting on the strict conditionality of the implementation of 
the Sejdić-Finci Judgement on behalf of the EU was a mistake: “It should not be a 
precondition. Making it one was a mistake” (European Stability Initiative 2013).
4. THE ROLE OF THE VISEGRAD STATES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
The article will now investigate the positions of the Visegrad Four states to-
wards Bosnia-Herzegovina. The analysis in this paragraph draws on research 
literature, which exclusively deals with the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in 
10  Great Britain is the EU Steering Group member that has rather sympathised with the hands-on 
positions as advocated by the United States.
Brought to you by Corvinus University | Unauthenticated | Downloaded 09/01/20 11:28 AM UTC
 VISEGRAD FOUR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 433
Society and Economy 37 (2015)
the subsequent paragraphs on the empirical research of the author conducted 
in mid-2014.11 Hungarian and Czech diplomats come to the conclusion that 
their countries’ expertise concerning transformation may be helpful but their 
voices are not heard in the concert of external actors who compete for influence 
(Tolksdorf 2012: 126).12 However, V4 are not alone in their powerlessness; it 
is shared with all who are not represented in the Steering Group of the Peace 
Implementation Council. In addition, coordination among V4 and their com-
mon lobbying does not go so far as to claim a seat in the Steering Group. Some 
smaller states follow more proactive policies and have a seat. For example, The 
Netherlands, who do everything in support of Bosnia-Herzegovina to correct 
their role before and during the Srebrenica disaster of 1995; or Sweden, a na-
tion in close co-ordination with the other Scandinavian countries to advocate a 
sincere and sustainable Human Rights agenda. Finally Spain, a bigger, but not 
huge, power in the region, provided EUFOR troops in great numbers and is in-
terested in the maintenance and functioning of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
mainly due to the independence movements in the Catalonia region of Spain 
(Tolksdorf 2012: 124–128). The seemingly timid policies of the V4 states can 
be easily explained: V4 are in line with the policies of the more important EU 
actors as they identify with the positions of the EU states that are Steering 
Group members. Engaging separately may lead to much higher costs and con-
tributions, which may not be worth it if the V4 can align themselves with the 
more active EU partners.
All three interview partners (the representatives of Slovakia, the Czech Re-
public, and Poland) confirm that the “sharing of institutional and procedural 
know-how” (Strážay 2012: 57–58) is very much applied in practice.13 The V4 fa-
cilitate collaboration among experts from their own countries and from Bosnia-
 Herzegovina. Experts from the Visegrad countries bring their knowledge of 
how to best plan, budget, administer, and realize EU-funded programmes. From 
the Bosnian perspective, V4 is perceived as an “honest broker” with limited 
self-interest especially as compared to neighbouring Croatia. Thematically , the 
11  A list of the interviewed persons can be found at the end of this article. All interviews were stan-
dardized qualitative interviews (length half an hour to one hour). The interviews focused on the 
specific country’s initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina (be it governmental or non-governmental), 
on coordination with V4 partners, on coordination in the V4-Plus format, and on coordination 
and cooperation with EU Steering Group members and other EU partners.
12  This was implicitly also the opinion of the interviewees of the smaller Visegrad states (inter-
views 5 and 6). The notion that V4 see themselves in the category of second class member 
states was present in the interviews of Tolksdorf in the year 2008 and 2009, but not in the 2014 
interviews that were conducted for this research.
13  All statements in this paragraph are based on the 2014 interviews.
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Czech Republic’s programmes focus on two areas: human rights and a variety 
of technical issues linked to the fulfilment of criteria of the acquis commun-
autaire, e.g. standards in agriculture, environmental requirements and health. 
Slovakia’s nature of engagement is similar to that of the Czech Republic. This 
translates to co-operation projects in the areas of agriculture, waste manage-
ment and energy production and efficiency. The exchange of experts in these 
areas is mutual, as Bosnian professionals frequently visit Slovakia. These per-
sonal and direct contacts are useful as they help minimize false perceptions 
regarding EU membership, argues the Slovak representative. All interlocutors 
came to the conclusion that it is this direct, project-related cooperation “on the 
ground” that best demonstrates the Bosnian partners the positive experience of 
EU approximation. Visegrad is certainly a role model, argues the representa-
tive of Poland, adding that economic transformation was a painful process in 
Poland during the times of transformation. Although many citizens lost small 
privileges, Polish society as a whole profited from the successful transformation 
to an efficiently run economy, which is today competition-based and developing 
into a knowledge-based economy. This process could serve as an example for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
All V4 interview partners confirmed that single projects of individual V4 states 
are not coordinated among V4 states. Despite this, the V4 do coordinate them-
selves in some way. V4 meet regularly and inform each other about their activi-
ties. This also happens in the V4-Plus format and in extended fora, where external 
actors are involved at all levels (ambassadors, embassy staff, and experts).14 As 
for information policy, V4 engages in “joint briefings.” Interlocutors came to the 
conclusion that four individual briefings may be considered irrelevant but a joint 
public relations engagement allows their voices to be better heard. The Four also 
regularly partake in two initiatives that should help “V4 identity building.” They 
celebrate together their national holidays on one occasion, dubbed as “Visegrad 
National Day” in late October or early November, a time when all four states 
celebrate their national holidays. They also host a common film week (“V4 film 
week”) or common exhibitions that bring together and display productions and 
art originating from the four countries.
14  V4-Plus is a format in which V4 encourage partners from the Central European region to par-
ticipate in common initiatives. These partners vary, depending on the policy area. V4-Plus 
partners are usually the three Baltic states and/or Romania and Bulgaria and/or Austria and/or 
Slovenia, and Croatia.
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5. REGIONAL PARTNERS OF THE VISEGRAD STATES 
AND THE ROLE OF CROATIA
The Visegrad states often wish to underline that they intend to reach out to more 
states of the Central European region in their activities. V4 moved to include the 
new member state of Croatia in their initiatives towards EU enlargement, offer-
ing the “Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Countries 
and Croatia on the Occasion of the Croatian Accession to the EU” (Visegrad 
Group 2013; Töglhofer 2013) on the eve of the Croatian accession. Croatia and 
Slovenia, however, conduct a more active policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
V4 are classic “decision-takers” whereas Croatia and Slovenia partly seek roles 
as “decision-shapers” or even “agenda-setters.” Also, Austria is a regional partner 
with an interest in EU enlargement, persisting that Bosnia remains prominent on 
the EU agenda (interview 1). Austria hosted the second annual summit of the 
so-called Berlin Process which started in mid-2014. With this initiative Germany 
and like-minded partners (e.g. Austria, but also V4) wish to demonstrate that 
the prospective Balkan enlargements are to remain on the EU agenda despite a 
widespread enlargement fatigue. As to the role of the Visegrad states and their 
outreach to like-minded partners, the academic literature and interviews with 
V4 actors indicate that the V4 has done little or nothing to better include these 
countries in their V4-Plus format concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina. This can be 
considered a missed opportunity as initiatives of Croatia, Slovenia and Austria 
often bear the same spirit as those of V4.
Slovenia urged in February 2014 a less paternalistic and more efficient han-
dling of Bosnia on behalf of the EU. Croatia went as far as to propose allowing 
Bosnia the status of “special” candidate (Euinside 2014). The Croatian proposal 
suggests that Bosnia should be allowed to fulfil EU conditions in the process of 
accession negotiations. This should happen step-by-step, bounded by strict con-
ditionality. The Croatian proposal, however, diverges from the current rules and 
regulations, requiring certain conditions to be fulfilled before the start of nego-
tiations. The proposal argues that strict conditionality during negotiations would 
encourage the Bosnian elite to implement all the necessary reforms the EU urges, 
particularly the constitutional reforms that would increase the functionality of the 
state. Croatia also expects much stronger participation on behalf of civil society. 
The Croatian proposal cites the EU accession strategies of the cases of Croatia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. In each of the cases, the EU was or has been willing to 
accommodate specific requirements of each candidate state. The proposal also 
makes a reference to Serbia as the EU granted Serbia candidate status despite 
disagreements concerning Kosovo. Serbia underwent the screening process and 
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started accession negotiations in 2014. It is argued that this flexibility on behalf 
of the EU is responsible for bringing Serbia on a pro-European course.
The Croatian initiative did not have an explicit impact on the protocol of 
the EU Foreign Ministers Council, where the proposal was discussed. Still, a 
“Compact for Growth” was decided upon and Croatia commented that Bosnia 
remains prominent on the EU agenda (Council of the European Union 2014). 
The Croatian proposal did, importantly, initiate a reflection process on how to 
move forward.15 The crucial starting point remains constitutional reform, which 
would transform Bosnia-Herzegovina into a functioning state. The EU Council 
of Ministers must now realize that the EU’s approach towards enlargement may 
differ from one candidate country to another (a “tailor-made” approach, as it is 
called in the Croatian proposal). This could have an effect on other candidate 
states. In the Macedonian case, both sides find themselves in a similar “frozen”, 
limbo situation, which cannot be overcome using existing strategy. In the Bos-
nian case, one can observe a stronger reflection, a critique of the “hands-off” ap-
proach strategy, and a search for alternatives. Even mainstream academia that is 
operating closely with major Western stakeholders confirms that Croatia revealed 
a weak point in the Western strategy. International Crisis Group’s (ICG) latest 
in-depth study, titled “Bosnia’s Future,” published in July 2014, includes many 
recommendations that are very similar to the suggestions of the Croatian proposal 
of Spring 2014. The ICG study urges the closure of the OHR and the start of EU 
accession negotiations. Concerning constitutional reform, the ICG suggests that 
the EU should draw on two or three European federal models to be discussed with 
Bosnian stakeholders. One of them should eventually be implemented in close 
coordination with these stakeholders. Similar to Croatia, this study urges much 
stronger involvement from civil society. 
In November 2014, a joint British-German initiative was launched that partly 
draws on the insights of the ongoing debate (Bassuener et al. 2014). It was also 
warmly greeted by the Croatian foreign minister as Croatia does not view it as an 
initiative that competes with the Croatian proposal. The initiative is a pragmatic 
proposal that seeks to find a way out of the current impasse. The initiative urges 
Bosnian politicians to commit themselves decisively to a package of (yet unde-
fined) reforms in order to bring the long-delayed Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) into force. When the SAA is made operational, Bosnia could 
profit from much needed financial mechanisms. The British-German initiative, 
also backed by the EU’s new foreign policy commissioner Federica Mogherini, 
15  According to the foreign minister of Croatia, Vesna Pusić, also the UK, Italy, Austria, 
and Hungary tabled written proposals on the issue how the EU shall move on with its 
Bosnia policies. See Euinside (2014.).
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indicates that unresolved economic issues are what now stand in the foreground. 
The immediate economic concerns of Bosnian citizens hold priority over the 
discrimination issue exemplified by the Sejdić-Finci ruling. The initiative does, 
however, state the importance of addressing the issue, but in due course. As 
to disagreements within the EU and the West; the joint initiative of these two 
powerful actors can be seen as a compromise between different viewpoints or 
at least a formation of a lowest common denominator. The above-mentioned 
Berlin Process incorporates the outcomes and progress made through the British-
German initiative.
6. BOSNIA, THE WEST AND ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL ACTORS: 
A COMPETITION SCENARIO
All involved in the discussion agree that Bosnia-Herzegovina has been all too 
long in a limbo situation. Externally launched reform initiatives have always 
proved unsuccessful because Bosnian politicians have not agreed with each other. 
The election results of October 2014 have not changed much concerning the at-
titudes or dominance of the actors as the ethnocentric parties won the confidence 
of Bosnian voters, thus perpetuating the ethnic divide among politicians. The 
West may react to neglected reform efforts with sanctions in the form of budget 
cuts. The West, however, must realize that each of the leaders of the three eth-
nicities may manipulate external sympathy to receive funding for their specific 
party. Bosniaks will naturally rely on Turkey and wealthy Arab states. Bosnian 
Serbs will continuously be able to count on Russian (Putin’s) support, as frequent 
meetings of Republika Srpska president Milorad Dodik and the Russian president 
suggest. In this respect, some warn that Putin may be able to enter the “soft un-
derbelly” of Europe, via Bosnia, and create another hybrid conflict area (Krastev 
2015). Bosnian Serbs may also count on support coming from national quarters in 
Serbia. Finally, Bosnian Croats have the EU member Croatia on their side. Thus, 
the West faces high obstacles to overcome.
The self-interest of the West is also obvious and telling of their need to com-
mit to the region. A “failed state” at the vulnerable south-eastern edge of the 
EU, with an over one thousand kilometre long border with EU member state 
Croatia, can bring many dangers. A border that is difficult to patrol efficiently 
leads to illegal migration, illegal trade of people and arms, as the legal situation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina diverges greatly from European standards. Each issue sig-
nals horror for European politicians. Hence, it would be in the EU’s best interest 
to increase the amount of invested resources and, at a minimum, the EU should 
maintain current levels of investment. If the West wishes to lead the country into 
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the European Union and create a functioning state, a strategy between the “hands-
on” and “hands-off” approach, clearly diverging from the Dayton construction, is 
needed. Linked to the EU’s commitment to a European Bosnia are higher budgets 
to reform and stimulate the economy, making citizens more independent from 
political parties, and creating sustainable employment opportunities in the coun-
try. The vision could perhaps be regarded as a “European Marshall Plan for the 
Balkan region.”
The West could, alternatively, resort to a policy used by the late Habsburg mon-
archy when faced with multiple challenges and crises: simply muddle-through 
perpetuating the limbo status of a situation.16 Not only would this practice de-
grade the Western model in the eyes of Bosnian citizens, but the continuation of a 
limbo state would encourage co-operation offerings from Turkey, the Gulf States, 
and Russia. The West does have the upper hand, however, as public opinion in 
Bosnia may err on the side of scepticism regarding offerings from the aforemen-
tioned external actors, preferring, instead, the terms of the British-German initia-
tive and the Berlin Process.
7. CONCLUSIONS FROM A VISEGRAD FOUR PERSPECTIVE
Visegrad Four has proven to be engaged actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina through 
their diplomatic presence and project work fostered by bilateral communication. 
In their external communication, V4 often steps up as a group because the four 
countries together can avoid marginalisation in the competitive external realm. 
V4 also has the advantage of being perceived as an impartial actor, advocating 
strategies that are best for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the single most important 
advantage as compared to the regional V4 partner Croatia (as Croatia is perceived 
to advocate on behalf of the Bosnian Croat population in the country). The activi-
ties of V4 and two regional actors, Austria and Slovenia, are not coordinated. The 
Visegrad Group may benefit from strengthening links with the two by coordinat-
ing their positions and initiatives. All in all, the Visegrad Four are engaged in 
concrete project work that encourages Europeanization processes in the country. 
This engagement could even be boosted in the likely future. On the other side, 
the Visegrad Four keep a low profile with little involvement in the institutions of 
the international community. Unlike the Scandinavian countries and the Nether-
16  The original German term for “muddle-through” used by emperor Franz Joseph I was “durch-
wurschteln.”
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lands, V4 is not willing to take over a more active role.17 This lack of involvement 
could be due to limited budgets and/or the conviction that V4 positions do not 
differ greatly from those of the more active European partners. Hence, despite 
their rhetoric for the importance of the Western Balkans, greater engagements in 
the form of greater financial commitments in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not appear 
beneficial for the Visegrad Four states.
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